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Introduction and Overview
The present thesis consists of seven papers specifying and analysing models
of direct-interactions-driven collective economic phenomena. Within theories and
models of coordination in large decentralised market economies (and analogously
also within theories and models of coordination in natural systems, for instance
models of magnetism) the notion of direct interactions is to be contrasted with the
notion of indirect interaction via aggregate signals, such as the price system. The
latter notion has been at the core of the Walrasian concept of decentralised eco-
nomic coordination (see Walras (1898)) which developed into the Arrow-Debreu
formulation of General Equilibrium Theory (see Debreu (1959) and Arrow and
Hahn (1969)). Unlike indirect interactions – for which realistic micro-foundations
(for instance, how a macroscopic signal emerges in a decentralised way) are ab-
sent in the Arrow-Debreu model and related models – direct interactions between
individuals are a straightforwardly realistic notion: they correspond to our daily
experience of social life, affecting attitudes, opinions, beliefs and decisions in all ar-
eas of life. Yet despite its intuitive appeal, the consideration of direct interactions
is a relatively new development in large-system coordination models in econom-
ics, with its roots going back to Fo¨llmer (1974).1 Blume and Durlauf define the
(direct) interactions-based approach as one “focusing on direct interdependencies
between economic actors rather than those indirect interdependencies that arise
through the joint participation of economic agents in a set of markets” (Blume
and Durlauf, 2001, p.16).2
1The literature on direct-interactions based phenomena includes Bisin et al. (2006), Blume
(1993, 1995), Cont and Bouchaud (2000), Horst and Scheinkman (2006), Kim and Markowitz
(1989), Kirman (1991, 1993), Levy et al. (1994) and Lux (1995). For a recent overview of
interactions-based models of financial markets, see Samanidou et al. (2007). Interactions-based
models are also often called agent-based models.
2It should be noted that strategic interactions which are modelled in Game Theory in many
cases fit into the category of direct interactions as defined by Blume and Durlauf (2001).
One can distinguish two polar types of direct-interactions models: those with
a fixed topology of interactions and those with random matching. In models with
a fixed topology, a graph represents the structure of inter-agent influence or com-
munication channels. Any given agent always interacts with the same subset of
other agents (called his local neighbourhood) - consisting of those agents to whom
a direct link exists.3 As a result, for any particular specification of variables as-
sociated with the agents the macroscopic properties of the system (obtained from
averaging over large subsets of these variables) might look quite different in dif-
ferent “areas” of the graph, at least temporarily. In contrast, in random matching
models for each instance of an interaction the two agents interacting are selected
randomly from the entire population of agents. Thereby the probability to be
matched with a certain type of agent corresponds to the empirical distribution
of types in the entire population. As a result, no “spatial” patterns emerge in
such models, and an approximation by indirect-interaction models becomes cor-
rect. Clearly, real-world matching schemes feature aspects of both of the above
polar cases: interaction partners are neither fixed, nor is it the case that they are
completely random, as past partners and future partners are in many cases not
independent.4 In the present thesis, Papers 4 and 5 are random matching models,
whereas all other papers involve a fixed topology.
An important conceptual issue by which many direct-interaction large-economy
models differ from the neo-classical modelling tradition is the following: Rather
than modelling individual decisions according to the economic concepts of rational-
ity – such that these decisions obtain endogenously in the model – large-economy
models with direct interactions are in many cases phenomenological on the indi-
vidual level. That is to say, some basic tendency driving the interactions between
agents, for instance the tendency to conform with others, is not derived from a ra-
tionality concept within the model (in other words, it is exogenous to the model).
Instead, a behavioural pattern is introduced based on empirical knowledge by
specifying appropriate stochastic transition kernels which produce the observed
3More generally, interactions of decreasing strength can be defined for those agents who are
“farther away” (i.e. who can be reached via two links, three links etc.
4For a mixture of both mechanisms, see Stauffer et al. (2006).
statistical regularity in large samples of individual agents.5 But it is important
to keep in mind that the stochastic specification does not represent intrinsic ran-
domness in individual behaviour but rather outside effects not considered in the
model.
Let us now turn to the second main notion emphasised in the title of the
thesis, namely the notion of collective phenomena. Loosely speaking, a collective
phenomenon is one in which the macroscopic properties of the system in no way
mirror the individual behaviour of the system. Rather, they emerge from the
interactions between the constituents. In contrast, in much of the neo-classical
modelling of large economies, a single “representative” agent allegedly representing
an entire sector of the economy is assumed (for a critique of this concept, see
Kirman (1992)). Thereby, the distinction between the micro-variables and macro-
variables of a system is effectively destroyed.
A reason for the prevalence of the representative-agent approach in neo-classical
economics is the complexity of the endogenous, rationality-based modelling of indi-
vidual decisions, which would lead in many cases to insurmountable computational
difficulties in models with many heterogeneous agents. Recently, however, mod-
els with many heterogeneous agents which are “simple” at the individual level
and which aim at collective phenomena have become increasingly popular among
economists (see, for instance, Galegatti and Kirman (1999)). This due to two
factors: first, the emerging strong evidence of the crucial role of heterogeneity
in modelling economic systems coming from empirical research, and, second, re-
sults of experimental research in economics pointing to the conclusion that the
rationality-based approach to individual decision making is insufficient or posi-
tively wrong (see, for instance, Selten (2001)).
Let us now turn to the methods of analysis of stochastic models of multi-
component (multi-agent) systems with direct interactions. In a few exceptional
cases, analytical techniques developed in mathematical physics are available, which
are applicable also to models of very large systems (these are models with an
infinite number of agents). Still, analytical techniques typically yield results of a
5In papers 1-6 the specification of interactions are such that agents tend to conform to the
expectations of others. There exists ample evidence that agents do so (see, for instance, Asch
(1951, 1956) and Festinger (1956)). The neo-classical tradition would require that this type of
behaviour is derived from some rationality principles.
principle nature (existence of an equilibrium measure, conditions for its uniqueness
vs. non-uniqueness etc.). As an alternative, Monte-Carlo techniques have become
widespread in the investigation of stochastic interactions-driven models. Monte
Carlo simulations readily provide a clear picture of the typical behaviour of models
with a finite set of agents.6 In the present thesis, all papers except Paper 6 feature
Monte-Carlo results of models with a finite set of agents.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, an overview of the papers con-
stituting the present thesis is given. Except Paper 7, in all papers of the present
thesis direct interactions affect individual expectations of agents. Traditionally,
expectations are modelled as autonomous, either rational – implying that they are
defined as being correct rather than emerging from certain cognitive procedures –
or derived by an individual agent by sampling the path of macroscopic variables
and forming adaptive, extrapolative or other types of expectations. However,
there is well-established empirical evidence from social psychology that expecta-
tions – just as any other type of individual judgements – are, at least to some
degree, affected by interactions among human beings. The papers 1-6 of this the-
sis demonstrate how interdependent expectations can shed new light on various
economic phenomena.
In particular, Part 1 of the thesis, consisting of Papers 1 and 2, features two
models of an interactive dynamics of economic sentiment in which no link between
economic sentiment and real economic variables is established. Such an approach
is admissible if one can neglect feedbacks from the real economic variables to eco-
nomic sentiment, such that the dynamics of economic sentiment can be modelled
separately from that of real economic variables. In these two models, economic
sentiment of a certain individual is affected by the consumer sentiment of others
and possibly by exogenous macroscopic shocks of an economic, social or political
nature. Each paper of Part 2 of the thesis – consisting of Papers 3, 4, 5 and 6 –
does establish a link between the interactive sentiment dynamics and real economic
variables. This link can be provided in various economic frameworks determining
real economic variables. In particular, Papers 4 and 5 are in the context of the
6Moreover, concepts have been developed how to generalise results by induction from finite
models to infinite models (this approach is called Thermodynamic Limit in Physics). However,
in economic applications the extension of results to infinite systems is often not desired, as the
number of agents is only modestly large.
standard Keynesian multiplier macro-model of consumption, output and saving,
while Paper 6 is in the context of General Equilibrium Theory. Paper 3 features
a model of precautionary saving which can be integrated within Keynesian, Gen-
eral Equilibrium and other models. By considering feedbacks from real economic
variables to economic sentiment, these papers integrate the notion of interactively-
driven consumer sentiment within a complete economic model framework, being a
quite new theoretical development. Finally, Part 3 containing Paper 7, addresses
the issue of new-product diffusion. In that context, direct interactions trigger the
formation of individual valuations for a new product. This part demonstrates
the flexibility of the stochastic interactions-based approach by showing that phe-
nomenologically quite different phenomena can by explained in an essentially same
conceptual approach to modelling interactions.
In the following, a brief summary of each of the seven papers is given. Paper
1, titled Socioeconomic interaction and swings in business confidence in-
dicators (being a joint paper with S. Pittnauer, S. Solomon and D. Stauffer)7 is
motivated by certain patterns in the German Ifo-Index data which were first inves-
tigated from the perspective of collective phenomena by Flieth and Foster (2002).
To account for such patterns in our paper, collective economic sentiment formation
is modelled as emerging from direct interaction between managers within an indus-
try. The neighbourhood structure of managers is assumed to be fixed (each agent
interacts with the same four neighbours over the entire time horizon). Following
the structure of the Ifo-survey, each manager can have three opinions: optimistic,
pessimistic or neutral. Each manager tends to conform with the opinions prevalent
in his/her reference group, with the strength of the tendency being different for
different types of opinion. The main result of the paper is the appearance of large
abrupt swings in the mean consumer sentiment. This phenomenon is well-known
in the study of collective phenomena in physics. It corresponds to the appearance
of spontaneous changes of the phase of the Ising model or the Blume-Capel model
of ferro-magnetism.
Paper 2, titled The impact of external events on the emergence of so-
cial herding of consumer sentiment, (which is a joint paper with S. Pittnauer
and D. Stauffer) incorporates the impact of external events on the dynamics of
7The paper has been published in Physica A (2005) 646-656.
economic sentiment in a model very similar to that featured in Paper 1. A direct-
interactions-driven dynamics of economic sentiment is represented by an Ising
model on a large (two-dimensional) square lattice. The individual states of agents
are called optimism and pessimism. The exogenous environment is modelled as
a sequence of random events, which might have a positive or negative influence
on economic sentiment. These exogenous events can be frequent or rare, have a
lasting impact or a non-lasting impact. Impact of events is inhomogeneous over
the lattice, as individuals might fail to perceive particular events. Events have a
probabilistic relation with the state of each individual agent – technically specified
in the same manner as the impact of states of neighbouring agents. The aim of
the paper is to investigate the effect of an exogenous environment on the emer-
gence of social herding of economic sentiment. We introduce two notions of social
herding: permanent herding refers to the situation where an ordered state (i.e.
a state with an overwhelming majority of optimists or pessimists) persists over
an infinite time horizon, while temporary herding refers to the situation where
ordered states appear, persist for some time and decay. The parameter of the
inter-agent interaction strength is such as to engender permanent herding without
the influence of the environment. We consider two cases: in the first case positive
and negative events have both the same empirical frequencies and strengths (i.e.
the environment is “neutral” in the long term), while in the second case events
have the same empirical frequencies but different strengths. In the neutral case
we find temporary herding if events are sufficiently “strong” and/or perceived by
a sufficiently large proportion of agents, and our results suggest that permanent
herding occurs for small values of the parameters. In the “non-neutral” case we
find only temporary herding.
Paper 3, titled Statistical economics on multi-variable layered net-
works (which is a joint paper with T. Erez and S. Solomon)8 extends the frame-
work of the above two papers by incorporating individual saving rate as a second
type of individual variable. In our model, the individual sentiment variables can
assume two values (optimism, pessimism), while the saving variables can assume
any of the Q budget shares 1
Q
, 2
Q
, . . . , Q−1
Q
, 1. The topology of interactions is that
8This paper has been published in the edited volume Economics: Complex Windows, ed.
M. Salzano and A. Kirman, Springer, 2005.
of a (large but finite) one-dimensional lattice with respect to each of the variable
types. Using the statistical approach, we introduce the regularity that an agent
who is optimistic about the prospects of the economy is likely to save more than
a pessimistic agent.
In addition to the economic issues just discussed, the paper makes the fol-
lowing contribution to the general issue on network architectures: Since the local
neighbourhood of each agent related to each of his/her individual variables need
not be identical (agents who influence an agent’s economic sentiment might not
be the same as those who influence his saving), agents are effectively linked in
a more complex way than what would be the case without the linkage between
individual saving and economic sentiment. A network structure representing that
situation (which arises quite naturally whenever an agent is characterised by more
than one interdependent variables) is sometimes called a Solomon-Network. Along
with Malarz (2003), the paper is one of the first to define and analyse stochastic
models on such network structures (see also Billari et al. (2006) for additional
motivation to consider such network structures in modelling socio-economic sys-
tems).
Paper 4, titled A note on interactions-driven business cycles (which is a
joint paper with F. Westerhoff)9 explores the impact of an interactive dynamics of
economic sentiment on real economic variables in the standard Keynesian multi-
plier framework. Unlike in the above Papers 1-3, the interactions are direct but not
local (random matching). That is to say, each consumer meets another consumer
at random, independently of whom he/she met before or what his/her individual
variable values are. The underlying micro-model of direct interactions is a version
of Kirman’s (1993) generic opinion formation model, with an additional feedback
effect from macroscopic variables on the transition probabilities. As in the above
model, pessimism (optimism) is assumed to engender higher (lower) saving. Our
model engenders cyclical fluctuations of economic variables, despite the fact that
neither the Keynesian multiplier model nor Kirman’s model does so on its own.
Paper 5, titled Business cycle synchronisation in a simple Keynesian
model with socially-transmitted economic sentiment and international
sentiment spill-overs (which is a joint paper with F. Westerhoff) is based on
9The paper appears in Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination 2(1), 2007.
the Keynesian multiplicator-accelerator model (see Samuelson 1939) with the novel
feature that national income expectations affect investment and drive the Samuel-
sonian accelerator dynamics (see Westerhoff 2006). The role of the interactive sen-
timent dynamics is the same as in the previous paper, while the influence channel
of economic sentiment is complementary: it is assumed that investors who hold
optimistic views about the future state of the economy expect a higher aggregate
demand in the following period and thus invest more than pessimistic ones. Sim-
ulations show that the model can generate a complex business cycle dynamics.
Based on that framework, a three-country model of business cycle synchronisa-
tion is provided, in which international spill-over effects on the level of economic
sentiment synchronise the national cycles, provided that investors believe that the
economies are indeed coupled.
Paper 6, titled Local-interactions-based coordination of equilibrium
expectations and the emergence of sunspot equilibria10 differs from all
other papers of the thesis in several respects: it features a model with an infinite
number of agents (representing the dynamics of a very large system), it investigates
the model analytically (using well-known results in Probability Theory) and it
is set in the context of General Equilibrium Theory.11 As all of the previous
papers, it introduces a stochastic direct-interactions-based dynamics of agents’
expectations. Unlike in the previous papers, the expectations refer to different
Walrasian equilibria which can prevail in the model economy in a future point
in time. The paper demonstrates that the stochastic direct-interactions-based
dynamics can explain how in General Equilibrium Theory one equilibrium (out of
multiple) can be decentrally agreed upon. Moreover the model naturally engenders
coordination into sunspot equilibria (with the sunspot events endogenously arising
in the coordination process).12
10A previous version is available online as Bonn Econ Discussion Paper 2005/23
11For those who are sceptical about the positive content of the assumptions underlying
General Equilibrium Theory, such as market clearing, one could perceive the paper as apply-
ing a direct-interactions mechanism to General Equilibrium Theory to alleviate some inherent
problems of it rather than to positive modelling.
12A sunspot-equilibrium in General Equilibrium models is one in which a random event
with no a-priori effect on the economy (called sunspot) nevertheless affects the economy because
agents believe that it does. Then due to the so arising macroscopic uncertainty the structure
The particular specification of transition rates chosen in the present paper is
known as the (two-dimensional) Voter Model. The composite process has two ex-
tremal invariant measures and a continuum of non-extremal invariant measures, to
each of which it can converge. Convergence to either one of the extremal invariant
measures corresponds to a deterministic coordination outcome, selecting a non-
sunspot equilibrium of the underlying economy. Convergence to a convex mixture
of invariant measures corresponds to a fully coordinated but random coordina-
tion outcome of individual expectations. The latter has precisely the structure
of equilibrium expectations in a sunspot equilibrium, and it is the uncertainty of
the coordination outcome which determines the set of sunspot equilibria of the
underlying economy. In effect, it is the non-ergodicity of the coordination process
which facilitates the occurrence of sunspot equilibria in the proposed model.
In the final Paper 7, titled Explaining delayed take-off in new-product
diffusion (which is a joint paper with S. Pittnauer and D. Stauffer)13 direct in-
teractions affect a quite different type of variable as compared to the previous six
papers. Instead of economic expectations, it is now the formation of the individual
valuation of a new product which is triggered by local direct interactions between
consumers: it is only upon the observation of a neighbour’s usage of a product
that a consumer forms the valuation of the product. In that model – despite
the formation of the valuation being triggered by the neighbours – the valuations
themselves are stochastically independent among agents. A consumer buys the
new product if her valuation of it is not below the price of the product in a given
period. From a technical perspective, the dynamics of the model amounts to a
stochastic process which is well-known in physics as site-percolation dynamics.14
It is known that there exists a real number called the percolation threshold Pc
which constitutes a value for the “transmission probability” above which “active”
sites spread over the entire graph with a significant probability, but “die out”
below of it, unless for extremely rare instances. The model presented in Paper
7 attributes the empirical finding of a delayed “take-off” of a new product to a
of the economy might change in such a way that the belief in the effect of the sunspot becomes
justified.
13The paper was accepted for publication in Industrial and Corporate Change subject to
minor extension and some data testing.
14See Stauffer and Aharony (1994)
drift of the percolation dynamics from a non-percolating regime to a percolating
regime. This drift is caused by learning effects lowering the price of the product,
or by network effects increasing its valuation by consumers, with an increasing
number of buyers.
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The impact of external events on the emergence of social herding of
economic sentiment
Martin Hohnisch, Dietrich Stauffer and Sabine Pittnauer∗
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Abstract
We investigate the impact of an exogenous environment on the emergence of social
herding of economic sentiment. An interactions-driven dynamics of economic senti-
ment is modeled by an Ising model on a large (two-dimensional) square lattice. The
individual states are called optimism and pessimism. The exogenous environment is
modeled as a sequence of random events, which might have a positive or negative in-
fluence on economic sentiment. These exogenous events can be frequent or rare, have
a lasting impact or a non-lasting impact. Impact of events is inhomogeneous over
the lattice, as individuals might fail to perceive particular events. We introduce two
notions of social herding: permanent herding refers to the situation where an ordered
state (i.e. a state with an overwhelming majority of optimists or pessimists) persists
over an infinite time horizon, while temporary herding refers to the situation where or-
dered states appear, persist for some time and decay. The parameter of the inter-agent
interaction strength is such as to engender permanent herding without the influence of
the environment. To investigate the impact of an environment we determine whether
an initially ordered state decays. We consider two cases: in the first case positive
and negative events have both the same empirical frequencies and strengths, while in
second case events have the same empirical frequencies but different strengths. (In the
first case the environment is “neutral”in the long term), In the neutral case we find
temporary herding if events are sufficiently “strong” and/or perceived by a sufficiently
∗We would like to thank F. Westerhoff and anonymous referees for very valuable comments on a previ-
ous version of the paper. All conceptual and technical shortcomings of the paper are those of the authors.
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large proportion of agents, and our results suggest that permanent herding occurs for
small values of the parameters. In the “non-neutral” we find only temporary herding.
Keywords: herding, economic sentiment, consumer confidence, endogenous vs. exogenous dy-
namics, local interactions, social interactions
1 Introduction
Recently, there has been renewed strong interest among scholars of economics in the notion
of consumer sentiment – a vague concept operationalized in particular surveys as a bundle
of consumer expectations and assessments of the economic prospects – on individual and
aggregate economic activity [11, 27, 35]. While consumer sentiment has been considered a
relevant indicator by practitioners of economic policy [20], economic modeling is primarily
concerned with other, more specific types of expectations (such as income and price expec-
tations for a particular point in time), and there is much less agreement among theorists in
what way – if any – the concept of consumer sentiment – or, more generally, the concept of
economic sentiment – should enter economic modeling.
The basic assumption of the present paper is that economic sentiment is prone to imita-
tive social influence, in that, say, a consumer is more likely to hold an optimistic (pessimistic)
expectation about the economic prospects if his peers do. That assumption is well substanti-
ated: according to experimental social psychology, an individual is the more likely to conform
to the judgment of others the less he is able to form his own judgment in a rational and
informed manner [1, 2, 13]. Since experimental studies in the human perception of complex
dynamic systems [16, 36] suggest that a typical consumer has only a limited perception about
the functioning of the economy and the political system in which it is embedded (arguably,
this limitation applies to a considerable extent even to specialists), one is indeed led to the
conclusion that the formation of economic sentiment is prone to social imitation. Social
imitation of consumer sentiment might or might not result in herding of economic sentiment
at the macroscopic level. The conditions for the emergence of sentiment herding at the
macroscopic level are investigated for a particular model in the present paper.
The general phenomenon of social herding has attracted much interest in economic the-
ory over the last two decades, particularly in the wake of disturbances on financial markets
(see [3, 5, 25, 26, 29, 6] for some seminal contributions). A principle question in models of
social herding is whether or not individual behavior should be derived from the principles
2
of economic rationality. The first two of the above cited papers do so. Our paper does
not, as it is based on the statistical modeling approach1 which directly applies to sentiment
formation the empirical evidence of social comparison processes (see [1, 2, 13]) rather than
explaining economic sentiment formation from rationality principles. We believe that the
statistical approach is particularly appropriate for modeling the dynamics of economic senti-
ment because economic sentiment, if considered as a particular instance, or at least part, of
a consumer’s mental model [8, 33], is a premise of individual reasoning and decision-making
rather than the subject of it. Most directly, our present paper belongs to the recent literature
on socially-driven economic sentiment formation [14, 21, 12, 37, 38].
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of an exogenous environment on the
emergence of social herding of consumer sentiment. Indeed, economic traders react as much
to the news coming from the broader geo-political environment – whether or not these news
items are objectively interpreted – as to the behavior/advice of others. Consumer sentiment
subject to social imitation is modeled in our paper as a large Ising field with nearest-neighbor
interactions on a (two-dimensional) square lattice. The individual states are called optimism
and pessimism. Social herding corresponds to the emergence of coordination states of the
Ising model, i.e. states with predominantly optimistic or predominantly pessimistic indi-
vidual entities. The environment is modeled as a a sequence of exogenous events (external
influences), stochastically fluctuating over time. The exogenous events can be frequent or
rare, have a lasting impact or a non-lasting impact. The field of events is not homogeneous,
as individual actors might fail to perceive events. Though the environment does have an im-
pact in existing models of financial herding, for instance in chartists-fundamentalists models
[25, 29] as changes in the fundamental value, or as news affecting traders [30], our model
– due to its simple abstract structure – is particularly suitable for analyzing the interplay
of social (local) interactions and environmental (global) influences in a more abstract way
suitable for computer simulations. 2
Motivated by our results, we introduce two notions of social herding in our model: perma-
nent herding, the stronger notion, refers to an ordered state (i.e. a state with an overwhelm-
ing majority of optimists or pessimists) which persists over an infinite time horizon, while
1See [15, 31, 19] for early formulations of the statistical modeling approach in economics and sociology.
2In socio-economic applications of the Ising model, an external environment has been previously consid-
ered by [19, 18, 22]. Relatedly, there has been much interest recently in the more general issue of disentangling
endogenous and exogenous dynamics in complex systems [9, 34].
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temporary herding refers to a state in which ordered states appear, persist for some time and
decay. The parameter of the inter-agent interaction strength in the underlying Ising field is
such as to engender a persistent ordered phase of the infinite model (permanent herding in
our terminology) without the influence of the environment. To investigate the impact of an
environment we determine whether an initially ordered state decays for the two cases that
positive and negative events have both the same empirical frequencies and strengths (i.e. the
environment is “neutral”in the long term) and that the latter property does not hold. In the
neutral case we find temporary herding if events are sufficiently “strong” and/or perceived
by a sufficiently large proportion of agents, and our results suggest that permanent herding
occurs for small values of the parameters. In the “non-neutral” case we find only temporary
herding.
In the present paper we concentrate on the interplay of endogenous and exogenous in-
fluences on economic sentiment, neglecting its link with real economic variables. We do so
because that link has not been investigated at the behavioral level; see [12, 37, 38], however,
for attempts to account for that link in similar or related models).
2 The model
We let the Ising model on a two-dimensional square lattice with nearest-neighbor interac-
tions represent socially-driven collective dynamics of economic sentiment.3 The variable xi
denotes the economic sentiment of agent i. Individual states xi = −1 and xi = 1 represent
the individual states of pessimism and optimism respectively. It is well-known that for in-
teractions between agents stronger than some critical value Jc (leaving aside any external
influences) there exist on the infinite lattice two phases of the sentiment field (“coordination
states”), with the economic actors in each of them being either predominantly pessimistic
or predominantly optimistic [10]. These phases are stable states which emerge – in an ap-
propriate formal sense – already in a large enough finite system [23] (“permanent herding”
3We must point out the limitations of our basic model. First, the topology of social interactions is hardly
as simple as a square lattice, yet we are not aware of empirical investigations of network structures for our
particular subject of social interactions, and network structures found for other contexts (see e.g. [4]) are
not necessarily transferable to our context [32]. Second, interactions need not be symmetrical with respect
to the individuals involved, as is the case in our model. Third, the individual states of economic sentiment
should be more rich, possibly even continuous. However, we do believe that the Ising model provides a first
approximation to the type of systems we aim to analyze.
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in our terminology).
The events affecting consumer sentiment (“the environment”) at a given point in time are
modeled in the present paper as realizations of a random variable B with the possible values
B = b (“positive” event), or B = −b (“negative” event), or B = 0 (no event) in the case of a
neutral environment, and B = −2b ceteris paribus in the case of a biased environment. We
assume an agent perceives the event correctly with probability p, while ignoring the event
with probability 1− p. Perception of an event is independent among agents. We introduce
a variable ǫi such that ǫi = 1 represents the situation that agent i perceives the event and
ǫi = 0 that he does not.
According to principles of statistical modeling, the following interaction potential4 ap-
propriately characterizes the interaction structure of our model in a finite square lattice
Λ
H(x) = −
J
2
∑
i,j∈Λ:||i−j||=1
xixj −B
∑
i∈Λ
ǫixi, (1)
with periodic boundary conditions specified in our simulations. The strictly positive parame-
ter J characterizes the interaction-to-noise ratio. The first sum accounts for local interaction
between individual agents, while the second accounts for the impact of the exogenous events.
In Monte-Carlo Statistical Physics equilibrium states are obtained from an appropriate
algorithm (which can be interpreted as a stochastic dynamics of the system), whereby indi-
vidual sites are sequentially updated according to the probabilities proportional to exp(−H),
using the prevailing configuration of next-neighbors. In doing so, we use the following spec-
ifications of the process Bt representing the environment: external events can be frequent
(time scales of the Ising field and the external field are comparable) (see Figure 1, top),
lasting but rare, (e.g. the environment may change only once in T updates of all individual
variables) (see Figure 1, top), and rare transitory (i.e. shocks; see Figure 1 bottom). Positive
and negative events/shocks occur equally frequent (on average) in all cases.
3 Results
Figure 2 summarizes our simulation results on the persistence of an initial ordered state
of the consumer sentiment field for the case of a large system and a neutral environment.
4In physics, Eq. 1 has the interpretation of energy, and the sum of individual energy contributions is
called Hamiltonian. In social sciences, we do not have a quantity corresponding to energy, such that Eq. 1
is merely a representation of interactions between people and events.
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The curves in Figure 2 separate areas of the parameter space – the parameters being the
proportion p of agents perceiving the event5 and event “strength” b – for which the initial
ordered state persists over 4000 Monte Carlo time steps (these areas are below a curve), and
in which the initial ordered states do not survive over 4000 MCTS (these areas are above a
curve). For a fixed b, the proportion p was diminished until for half of the four simulated
samples no change from the initial optimistic majority to a slight majority of pessimists was
observed during 4000 iterations (sweeps through the lattice). This border point then was
put into Fig.2.
As 4000 is a somewhat arbitrary time scale, we also investigated stability of an initial
ordered state over very long times for frequent news and Jc/J = 0.9. Figure 3 depicts the
dependence on p of the median time at which the ordered state is destroyed for a fixed
exemplary value b = 1. It turns out that this time tends to infinity for p ≃ 0.16, close to the
corresponding p ≃ 0.20 for 4000 iterations in Figure 2. This suggests that there is an area
of the parameter space (presumably separated by a curve running slightly below the curve
in Fig. 2) for which an ordered state is stable over infinite time horizons for a very large
lattice. (Small lattices do not have shar transitions.) In this case, the environment does not
have a destructive impact on collective consumer sentiment.
What are the properties of the model for parameters b and p above a curve in Fig. 2?
The inspection of figures displaying time-paths of the proportion of optimists/pessimists for
parameter values above a curve in Fig. 2 (available from the authors on request) shows that
the typical time-path above a curve in Figure 2 is irregular: Periods of collective pessimism
emerge, persist for some time and decay, as do periods of collective optimism. Periods of
collective pessimism and optimism change much more slowly than the exogeneous environ-
ment, thus collective pessimism (optimism) often persist while and despite positive (negative)
events occur. Periods of collective pessimism and optimism occur – as positive and negative
events – equally frequently over time for the neutral environment.
These results lead us to introduce two notions of social herding in our model: permanent
herding, the stronger notion, refers to an ordered state (i.e. a state with an overwhelming
majority of optimists or pessimists) which persists over an infinite time horizon, while tem-
porary herding refers to a state in which ordered states appear, persist for some time and
decay. (Note that the parameter of the inter-agent interaction strength in the underlying
Ising field is such as to engender a persistent ordered phase of the infinite model – perma-
5Clearly, for large enough systems this fraction equals the probability p of an agent perceiving the event.
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nent herding in our terminology – without the influence of the environment.) Thus, for the
neutral environment, our results strongly suggest that permanently stable ordered states of
collective pessimism/optimism do not occur if events are too strong and/or are considered
by a sufficiently large proportion of agents. This is due to a “competition” between the
social mechanism tending to produce coordination, and the disorder of the external envi-
ronment. Given that positive and negative events have equal empirical frequencies, such
that the environment is “neutral” with respect to sentiment, it is quite intuitive that a
widespread perception of external events destroys endogenous collective states: the disorder
of the environment then prevails over the tendency to herding in economic sentiment.
We also considered an environment which is biased in favor of pessimism. We take the
strength of negative event as −2b, i.e. twice as strong as the positive event b. Analogously
to Fig. 2, the curves in Figure 4 separate areas of the parameter space in which the initial
ordered state persists for a simulation length of 4000 Monte Carlo time steps (these areas
are below a curve), and in which the initial ordered states does not survive over 4000 MCTS
(these areas are above a curve). Fig.4 shows that the b or p values required for this transition
are now drastically smaller than for the neutral environments in Fig.2. Analogously to Fig.3
we show in Fig.5 the variation of the median destruction time, but now for this biased case
of Fig.4. Roughly the data follow a straight line on this log-log plot, suggesting a finite
decay time for all finite p, going to infinity for p → 0 only. We see upward deviations for
small p but the larger the lattice is the smaller are these deviations. Thus in the biased case,
in contrast to the unbiased one, the initial order is always destroyed if we only wait long
enough.
4 Discussion
States of “collective pessimism” – if this social phenomenon indeed occurs – might be detri-
mental to the efficiency of allocation of economic resources. Indeed, “explanations” to that
effect can often be heard in the public discussion about the state of the economy and eco-
nomic policy. We believe that economic-sentiment-based arguments are relevant despite the
lack of proper theoretical foundations, and the present paper is an exploratory step toward
formulating relevant models. Our results confirm an intuitive presumption: attention to
news reduces the prevalence of collective economic sentiment. This result appears to suggest
that our model might be a useful starting point, though the present paper does not cover
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several important issues. In particular, the role of the graph structure of the underlying
network should be investigated. Also, we have not specified the actual “transmission mech-
anism” of economic sentiment into economic variables necessary for a welfare analysis of the
impact of collective economic sentiment.
A more general problem lies in the fact that what we called environment is only in
part exogenous, as the economy itself produces relevant news which is interpreted by the
decision-makers – albeit not necessarily in a correct way. For instance, prolonged investor
pessimism might lead to a reduction of GDP, which in turn negatively affects investor sen-
timent. Such collective expectational biases turning into real economic forces have been
qualitatively described by Keynes [24], but are largely neglected in modern macroeconomic
theory. (In contrast, recent modeling of financial markets does incorporate expectational
biases (see [28, 29] for seminal contributions to this research direction). The present model
does not include a feedback from real macro-variables (“endogenous environment”) to the
economic sentiment (see [38] for an attempt in this direction) as we do not specify a link of
economic sentiment to real variables.
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Figure 1: Time-patterns of the process Bt representing the environment: time scales of the
Ising field and the external field are comparable (top), lasting but rare events (middle) and
rare transitory events (shocks) (bottom). The proportion of positive and negative events is
equal on average for the neutral environment.
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Figure 2: Areas of the parameter space of our model where ordered states persist and do
not persist for a neutral environment for 4000 sweeps through a 3001 x 3001 lattice: ordered
states of collective sentiment exist for vectors of the parameter values below a boundary
curve, but do not exist for vectors of parameter values above; the curves are as follows: (+)
frequent events, Jc/J = 0.99, (×) frequent events, Jc/J = 0.9; (∗) rare persistent events,
Jc/J = 0.9, (sq.) shocks Jc/J = 0.9.
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Figure 3: The dependence on p of the median time at which the ordered state is destroyed
for the exemplary value b = 1; frequent events, b = 1, side of the square lattice d= 301(+),
1001(x), 3001(*).
13
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2
pr
op
or
tio
n 
p
strengths b and -2b
Figure 4: As Figure 2, but for biased (non-neutral) environment. We made 4000 sweeps for
Jc/J = 0.90 (+,x) and 0.99 (*), for frequent events only, for 1001×1001 (+) and 3001×3001
(x,*) lattices. For 1001× 1001 at Jc/J = 0.99 the symbols would overlap with those for the
larger lattice and are thus not shown.
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Figure 5: As Figure 3, but for biased (non-neutral) environment. The side of the square lat-
tice d is 301 (+), 1001 (x), 3001 (solid line) und 10,001 (square). The dashed line corresponds
to a power law time = 10/p4.
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Abstract 
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1 Introduction 
Recently, there has been much interest among economists in the role of interactions-driven 
socio-economic processes which may lead to important phenomena such as herding in 
financial markets (Kirman 1993, Lux 1995) or the formation of economic sentiment 
(Franke 2007a, Westerhoff and Hohnisch 2007). Some of the basic principles of these 
models have already been proposed by Weidlich and Haag (1983). Not reliant on strong 
rationality concepts, such models are well-suited for formalizing notions such as Keynesian 
“animal spirits” (Keynes 1936).  
Following that general approach, the present paper defines and analyzes a modified 
Keynesian multiplier-accelerator model1 which is intertwined with an interactions-driven 
process of individual economic sentiment. In our model, economic sentiment affects 
investment expenditures via the investors’ national income expectations, and, in turn, is 
itself affected by social interactions and national income movements. More precisely, we 
replace the Samuelsonian accelerator term )( 1−− tt YYi  by an expectation-based term 
, i.e. investment expenditures do not depend on past changes in national 
income but on the current expected change in national income. Then, we assume that each 
investor expects an increase in national income in the following period if he is optimistic 
and a decrease if he is pessimistic. The investor is more likely to become optimistic if 
national income is increasing, and is more likely to become pessimistic if national income is 
decreasing, thereby providing a macroscopic feedback from national income movements to 
expectation formation.  
)][( tt YYEi −
                                                 
1 We use a simple Keynesian goods market setup to be able to pin down some of the causalities acting 
inside our model. Note that the Keynesian multiplier-accelerator model or related Keynesian models are 
frequently applied in economics (e.g. Chiarella, Flaschel and Franke 2005, Puu and Sushko 2006). 
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Simulations reveal that our simple model is able to produce intricate oscillations in 
national income. We then use the model to propose a sentiment-based explanation of 
international business cycle synchronization in a three-country model. The economies 
become coupled and their cycles synchronized through “sentiment-spillover effects” across 
the economies if investors believe that the economies are indeed coupled. This effect occurs 
in our model even without trade between the economies, pointing to the potential role of 
economic-sentiment-based effects in business cycle synchronization. Our work 
complements real-sector (trade-based) arguments explaining business cycle synchronization 
as put forward by Frankel and Rose (1998), among others. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 specifies the basic model and 
analyzes its dynamics. Section 3 extends the basic model into a three-country model in 
which the emergence of business cycle synchronization due to business-sentiment spill-over 
between countries is demonstrated. Section 4 concludes with some additional comments. 
 
2 The basic model 
Our model extends the multiplier-accelerator model of Samuelson (1939). Accordingly, 
national income at time step  is given by 1+t
111 +++ += ttt ICY ,                                                                                                        (1) 
where  and I denote aggregate consumption and aggregate investment expenditures, 
respectively.  
C
Consumption depends on the last period’s national income  
tt YcC =+1 .                                                                                                                    (2) 
The marginal propensity to consume is denoted by 10 << c . 
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As in Westerhoff (2006), we do not assume that induced investments are 
proportional to the observed change in national income between period t and period t-1 
(as in Samuelson 1939), but are proportional to the expected change in national income 
between period t and period  t+1. Thus, we specify that 
),][( 11 ttt YYEiII −+= ++                                                                                               (3) 
where the first component stands for autonomous investments and the second 
component reflects the accelerator principle which now entails expectations. 
Expectation formation is sentiment-driven: If an investor is optimistic 
(pessimistic), he expects that national income will increase (decrease) by an exogenous 
amount e>0. The average value of the expected national income may thus be written as 
))(1()(][ 1 eYWeYWYE ttttt −−++=+ ,                                                                         (4) 
where  and tW )1( tW−  are the fractions of optimistic and pessimistic investors, 
respectively. 
Inserting (2)-(4) in (1) yields 
))1((1 tttt WeeWiIcYY −−++=+ .                                                                               (5)         
Note that for fixed fractions of optimistic and pessimistic agents, (5) would turn into a 
first-order linear difference equation. This observation will become important later on. 
Let us next give an informal description of how the fraction of optimistic 
(pessimistic) investors evolves over time. We assume that there are  investors in 
total, with each investor being in either an optimistic or a pessimistic state of mind. We 
follow Kirman (1993) in specifying that in each time period two investors meet at 
random and the first will adopt the state of mind of the other with a probability 
N
)(1 ⋅−δ . 
In addition, there is a small probability ε  that an investor will change his attitude 
independently. Unlike in Kirman’s (1993) model, the probability that one agent may 
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convince another agent is asymmetric in that an optimist is more likely to convert a 
pessimist when national income is increasing then a pessimist is likely to convert an 
optimist. Similarly, when national income decreases, chances are higher that a pessimist 
will convert an optimist than the other way around.  
Formally, let  denote the number of optimistic agents at time step t. 
The transition probability for the birth-and-death process of K is specified as follows  
NWK tt =
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
−−
−
−−+=−
−−+
−=+
=
−−+−−
−→−−−−−
−→−−+−−
111
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
11
1
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1
)1((1
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1
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ttt
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t
t
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t
t
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t
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δε
,          (6) 
where the probability that a pessimist converts into an optimist is 
⎩⎨
⎧
−
<−+= −−→− otherwise
YYfor ttOP
t γ
γδ
5.0
05.0 21
1                                                                      (7) 
and the probability that an optimists converts into a pessimist is 
⎩⎨
⎧
−
>−+= −−→− otherwise
YYfor ttPO
t γ
γδ
5.0
05.0 21
1 ,                                                            (8) 
respectively. 
        We now turn to the dynamics of our model. The simulation run displayed in 
figure 1 has been produced with the following parameter setting:  
.05.0,45.0,100,5.0,10,5.3,9.0 ======= εγNeIic  
The top panel of figure 1 shows the evolution of national income while the bottom panel 
depicts the number of optimistic agents. The figure demonstrates that our model is able 
to generate complex swings in economic activity. Both the duration and the amplitude 
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of the business cycles vary strongly over time.2  
---------- Figure 1 goes about here ---------- 
Let us now discuss the origin of these business cycles in our model. For fixed 
fractions of optimistic and pessimistic agents, the evolution of national income is due to 
the iteration of a first-order linear difference equation. In this case, the level of 
autonomous expenditures is determined by the relation between optimistic and 
pessimistic investors. If all agents are optimistic, then total autonomous expenditures 
are eiI +  so that equilibrium income is )1/()( ceiI −+ . Should there be as many 
optimistic as pessimistic agents, then the autonomous expenditures amount to I  and 
equilibrium income is )1/( cI − . Finally, if all agents are pessimistic, autonomous 
expenditures decrease to eiI −  and national income is equal to )1/()( ceiI −− . Since 
the marginal propensity to consume is below one, our model implies that national 
income always monotonically approaches equilibrium income and thus may not leave 
the lower and upper boundaries )1/()( ceiI −+  and )1/()( ceiI −− .   
However, the equilibrium income itself undergoes a rather cyclical movement 
within these upper and lower boundaries. This is illustrated in figure 2 in which we have 
plotted national income in period t+1 against national income in period t. The line 
segments Kmin and Kmax stand for the maps in which all agents are either optimistic or 
pessimistic. The corresponding equilibrium incomes are given by the intersections of 
these maps with the 45-degree line. Suppose now that we are in period τ and that the 
fraction of optimistic agents results in the map Kτ. Obviously, national income 
converges within two time steps from Yτ to Yτ+Δt. Note that if the fraction of optimistic 
                                                 
2 Recall that for c=0.9 and i=3.5, the multiplier-accelerator model of Samuelson (1939) generates unstable 
oscillations. Our present setup may cope with such parameter values. 
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agents increases, the map Kτ shifts upwards, for instance to Kτ+Δt. Again, we have drawn 
the evolution of national income for two additional time steps. Once national income is 
increasing (decreasing) the bias of the social interactions and the income equilibrium 
movements jointly manage to sustain that movement. A turnaround may set in either 
randomly or when the upper (lower) boundary of national income is eventually reached. 
---------- Figure 2 goes about here ---------- 
A high time-resolution excerpt of the dynamics is presented in figure 3. On the 
left-hand side, the number of optimistic investors is depicted. Note that this number 
does often not change from one time step to the next. On the right-hand side, the 
evolution of national income for the corresponding time slot is presented. It changes in 
each time step according to (5). We remark that national income is computed in our 
model in each time step, i.e. after each instance of an interaction between two agents. 
However, running the sentiment dynamics for several time steps between two 
consecutive computations of national income may yield quite similar fluctuations in 
sentiment and economic variables.  
---------- Figure 3 goes about here ---------- 
 
3 A multi-country model with business cycle synchronization 
In the present section, we consider three national economies, indexed by D, F and I. To 
demonstrate that a mechanism based on international coupling of economic sentiment 
may in itself be sufficient to produce business cycle synchronization, we abstract in our 
three-country model from goods transfers between the countries.  
The equations determining the national economy remain the same as in the basic 
model, apart from being indexed by the respective national economy. For instance, for 
D we have 
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respectively. 
We introduce a trans-national coupling of economic sentiment in the following 
way: For the transition probabilities, we now specify that the bias towards optimism 
(pessimism) in times when national income is rising (falling) also includes spill-over 
effects from the other two national economies (with p denoting a parameter representing 
the degree of coupling between the economy of D with the two other countries, as 
perceived by investors in D). Therefore, we obtain 
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Analogous equations hold for the other countries. 
Note that the coupling of the three national economies is a self-fulfilling 
prophecy in our model: If investors believe that the countries are coupled (that is that 
the rise or decline of national income in the other countries is relevant for the prospect 
in the own country) then our simulations discussed below show that business cycles 
resulting from Samuelson’s multiplier-accelerator principle indeed will be synchronized 
(in an amount dependent on the parameter p). However if the investors do not believe in 
such a coupling, then no mechanism in our model would account for business cycle 
synchronization. 
Let us now present some simulation results of the dynamics of our three-country 
model. Figures 4-7 show the time-parallel evolution of national income in each of three 
countries for the values of the sentiment coupling parameter of  p=0, p=0.125, p=0.25 
und p=0.5, respectively. A casual investigation of the diagrams reveals that the business 
cycles resulting from our model become increasingly synchronized with increasing 
values of p.F3F The synchronization is even clearer visible in the correlation plots 
presented in figure 8 in which business cycle correlation between two of the three 
national economies (F and D) are depicted. The plot in the top left quadrant shows the 
case of no coupling (p=0), and the series continues with p=0.125 (top right), p=0.25 
(bottom left) and p=0.5 (bottom right). 
---------- Figures 4-8 go about here ---------- 
                                                 
3 Although investors match randomly in our model, local phenomena may nevertheless show up in 
individual countries.  
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4 Discussion 
The aim of our paper is twofold. First, we show how social interactions on the level of 
individual economic sentiment may lead to rather stable business cycles in Samuelson’s 
(1939) multiplier-accelerator model. The mechanism which engenders such cycles in 
the present paper is complementary to that suggested and analyzed by Westerhoff and 
Hohnisch (2007) who apply a pure multiplier model. In their paper, consumer sentiment 
affects individual consumption propensities while in our paper economic sentiment 
affects individual expectations which, in turn, impact upon investment. The present 
paper is also related to Westerhoff (2006) in which investors switch between 
extrapolative and regressive predictors with respect to market circumstances. In his 
model, nonlinear deterministic interactions between the investors may lead to chaotic 
business cycles. In the present model, we abstract from such expectation formation rules 
to highlight which ingredients are sufficient to produce endogenous business cycles in 
our framework.F4F In that sense, our model is minimalist. 
Second, with this basic model producing endogenous business cycles we 
illustrate in a three-country framework how business cycle synchronization may arise if 
an investor believes that information concerning the other national economies is 
relevant for the prospects of his own national economy. Again, the model is minimalist 
in the sense that we abstract from goods transfers between the countries which are 
presumably of importance for the phenomenon of business cycle synchronization.  
It would be tempting to test to what extent economic sentiment is synchronized 
over various countries. This empirical issue would presumably add to results on 
                                                 
4 However, it should be noted that a kind of extrapolative expectations may endogenously emerge within 
our model. Suppose that national income is increasing. In such a situation, more and more agents become 
optimistic and at some point in time, aggregate expectations and national income changes become 
positively correlated. 
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business cycle synchronization itself. However, it appears to be difficult to answer a 
basic question implied by the present paper: Is the synchronization of business 
sentiment causal for the emergence of business cycle synchronization, or does the 
causality go in a different direction – if business cycle synchronization arises for 
different reasons then business sentiment synchronization, then synchronization of 
business sentiment – if indeed it is evident from the data – might be a by-product of the 
former. Of course, it is very well possible that both phenomena are endogenously 
intertwined and no clear direction of causality prevails. However, recent progress in 
estimating models with heterogeneous interacting agents has been achieved by 
Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner (2005), Lux (2007) and Franke (2007b). 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the dynamics of the basic model in section 2. The panels present 
the evolution of national income (top) and the number of optimistic investors in the time 
domain with 10000 observations. Parameter values are given in section 2. 
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Figure 2: The dynamics of the model for a fixed number of optimistic investors. We 
plot national income in period t+1 against national income in period t. 
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Figure 3: The number of optimistic investors (left) and national income (right) for a 
short time interval. Parameters as in section 2. 
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Figure 4: Illustration of the dynamics of the three-country model of section 3. The 
panels show the evolution of national income (left) and of the number of optimistic 
investors (right). The countries are D (top), F (central) and I (bottom). The sentiment-
spillover parameter is set p=0. The other parameter values are as in section 2. 
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Figure 5: Illustration of the dynamics of the three-country model of section 3. The same 
simulation design as in figure 4 but now p=0.125. 
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Figure 6: Illustration of the dynamics of the three-country model of section 3: The same 
simulation design as in figure 4 but now p=0.25. 
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Figure 7: Illustration of the dynamics of the three-country model of section 3. The same 
simulation design as in figure 4 but now p=0.5. 
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Figure 8: A series of scatter plots depicting business cycle correlation between two of 
the three national economies (F and D) emerging in our model. The plot in the top left 
quadrant shows the case of no coupling (p=0), and the series continues with p=0.125 
(top right), p=0.25 (bottom left) and p=0.5 (bottom right). 
LOCAL-INTERACTIONS-BASED COORDINATION OF EQUILIBRIUM
EXPECTATIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF SUNSPOT EQUILIBRIA
M. HOHNISCH
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to introduce a stochastic model of decentralized co-
ordination of individual equilibrium expectations in a large sequential-trade economy, and
to demonstrate that this coordination model naturally engenders sunspot equilibria (with
the sunspot events endogenously arising in the coordination process), thereby providing
a positive rationale for the emergence of such equilibria. Decentralized coordination of
equilibrium-expectations is facilitated by local interactions between agents. Interactions
are modeled by specifying a locally interdependent family of individual stochastic processes
on a two-dimensional integer lattice Z2 in continuous time. The particular specification
of transition rates chosen in the present paper is known as the (two-dimensional) Voter
Model. The composite process has two extremal invariant measures and a continuum of
non-extremal invariant measures, to each of which it can converge. While convergence to
either one of the extremal invariant measures corresponds to a deterministic coordination
outcome, selecting a non-sunspot equilibrium of the underlying economy, convergence to
a convex mixture of invariant measures corresponds to a fully coordinated but random
coordination outcome of individual expectations. The latter has precisely the structure of
equilibrium expectations in a sunspot equilibrium, and it is the uncertainty of the coordina-
tion outcome which determines the set of sunspot equilibria of the underlying economy. In
effect, it is the non-ergodicity of the coordination process which facilitates the occurrence
of sunspot equilibria in the proposed model.
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1. Introduction
It is well-known that in Walrasian economies sunspot equilibria can arise if agents come
to expect that the market equilibrium depends on the occurrence of some random event
which is otherwise irrelevant to the economy and if the occurrence of this event is not in-
surable (see Cass (1989) for the particular type of economy referred to in the present paper,
and Cass and Shell (1983) for the general issue of sunspot equilibria). Yet from a positive
perspective, relatively little is known about how the structure of expectations prevailing in
a sunspot equilibrium can be facilitated by some decentralized mechanism. More generally,
the question of how decentralized coordination of equilibrium expectations can be facili-
tated is an open problem in any rational-expectations model with multiple equilibria. In
that context, the aim of this paper is to introduce a stochastic model of decentralized co-
ordination of individual equilibrium expectations in a large sequential-trade economy, and
to demonstrate that this coordination model naturally leads to sunspot equilibria (with
the sunspot events endogenously arising in the coordination process), providing a positive
rationale for the emergence of such equilibria.
In the present paper, the coordination of equilibrium expectations is facilitated by direct
local interactions between agents. The interactions dynamics is modeled as a continuous-
time Markov process. The process consists of a family of individual processes, indexed by
the two-dimensional integer lattice Z2. The index set Z2 corresponds to the set of agents in
the economy. Each individual process has a common state space consisting of two distinct
particular equilibrium expectations. The individual processes are locally interdependent in
that the transition rate of the individual expectation held by an agent also depends on the
configuration of individual expectations of his nearest neighbors (with respect to Z2). The
particular specification of transition rates is known as the (two-dimensional) Voter Model.
The basic properties of the above process are the following (see Liggett (1985) for a
comprehensive treatment): It is non-ergodic with two extremal invariant measures. It can
converge to either one of its extremal invariant measures, in which mass is concentrated
on a “full-consensus” configuration (a configuration in which all agents hold the same
expectation), or to an element of the continuum-set of non-extremal invariant measures
(being convex mixtures of the extremal invariant measures), each of which has both full-
consensus configurations as its support. Any particular limiting distribution of the process
can be traced back to a set of initial configurations or more general initial distributions of
expectations.
3The above described interaction dynamics of individual equilibrium expectations is em-
bedded in simple Walrasian two-period sequential-trade economies as a decentralized coor-
dination mechanism for individual equilibrium expectations. Due to the particular structure
of the limiting distributions of the expectations dynamics, the following interpretation in
terms of the coordination outcome applies to the respective types of its limiting behavior:
While convergence of the process to either one of the extremal invariant measures corre-
sponds to a sunspot-free coordination state of expectations in an underlying economy (the
process being in this case a mechanism of equilibrium selection, see Section 3.1), conver-
gence to a non-extremal invariant measure engenders a sunspot equilibrium in an underlying
economy: the limiting distribution represents a fully coordinated but random coordination
outcome on the level of individual expectations, and the randomness of the coordination
outcome itself constitutes the sunspot event (see Section 3.2 where the underlying sunspot
equilibrium is that analyzed by Cass (1989)).
The principle behavioral assumption in the proposed coordination-mechanism is that an
agent who must form an expectation about the occurrence of a future event but lacks rele-
vant information to do so tends to align himself with the expectations held by other agents
in his “reference group”. The reader is referred to empirical results in social psychology
which provide evidence that there is a tendency to socially-driven alignment of opinion in
humans. Pioneering results in that field of research are those of Asch (1951, 1956) and
Festinger (1954). The present paper does not attempt to provide an explanatory model for
such reference-group influence in expectation formation (for an instance of such a model
see Banerjee (1992).)
Also, it should be stressed that a stochastic modelling of expectations does not imply that
expectations are necessarily to be thought of as random in a behavioral sense. One might
well propose deterministic interactive behavioral mechanisms on the micro-level, possibly
more explanatory in character. However, when applied in modelling large systems, such
deterministic models would most likely produce a degree of complexity which is solvable
neither analytically nor numerically for long-enough periods of time. Therefore, the sto-
chastic modelling approach to large economies should be considered as a statistical one1 -
a descriptive shortcut providing the possibility of analyzing analytically the aggregate be-
havior of a large economy with the structure of direct interactions between agents deduced
empirically.
1Such a modelling approach corresponds to a concept called Statistical Economics. The terminus has been
suggested by J.M. Grandmont (1992) alluding to Statistical Physics. Seminal work in this direction was
done by Hildenbrand (1971) and Fo¨llmer (1974).
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The organization of the present paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic specifica-
tions and properties of the proposed stochastic process of expectations based on well-known
mathematical results concerning the Voter Model. Section 3 provides two examples of how
the process can be incorporated into concrete GET-models. In Section 3.1, an example of
equilibrium selection facilitated by the expectation-coordination model in decoupled spot-
markets (“trivial sunspot-equilibria” in the terminology of Mas-Colell (1992)) is outlined.
In Section 3.2, the expectations dynamics endogenously creates sunspot equilibria. The
particular setting is based on Cass’s (1989) leading example of sunspot equilibria in a two-
period economy with nominal assets. Finally, Section 4 contains a few additional comments
on the results presented, in particular it relates the present model to existing economic work
applying similar types of stochastic processes.
2. A stochastic model of interactions-driven dynamics of expectations
This section introduces a family of locally interacting stochastic processes, representing
in the present paper the time-evolution of individual equilibrium expectations. Such a
family can be viewed as a single process on the corresponding product space. Assume
that at any given time t ∈ R+, an agent can expect one of two equilibria to obtain in the
following trading period. These individual expectation states are denoted by e1 and e2 and
the individual state space of the process by S = {e1, e2}.2 The countably infinite set of
agents is denoted by A, and by X := SA the set of expectation configurations of agents in
A. (The space X is compact in the product topology.) Let ηa,t ∈ S denote the expectation
of agent a at time t ∈ R+ and ηt ∈ X a configuration of expectations at time t.
To specify a topology of local interactions, the set of agents A is endowed with a time-
invariant graph structure (implying that each agent a always interacts with the same subset
N(a) ⊂ A of other agents). In the present paper we identify A with the two-dimensional
integer lattice Z2 and set N(a) = {b ∈ Z2 : |b − a| = 1} with | · | denoting the Euclidean
distance in R2. The particular specification of transition rates chosen in this paper is
known as the (two-dimensional) Voter Model.3 The transition mechanism is given by the
2In general, the individual allocations and prices in equilibrium become known to the agents only “after” the
expectation coordination process has converged to a limiting distributions. This is because in the case when
the process engenders a coordination state of expectations corresponding to a sunspot equilibrium, the set
of equilibria will depend on the limiting distribution of the process (because it determines the probability
of the “sunspot event”; see Section 3.2 of this paper). In contrast, when the coordination process engenders
a deterministic full-consensus coordination outcome the expectations correspond to a-priori given market
equilibria of the underlying economy (see Section 3.1).
3The Voter Model was introduced independently by Clifford and Sudburry (1973) and Holley and Liggett
(1975). For an extensive discussion, see Chapter V of Liggett (1985) and Part II of Liggett (1999).
5assumption that ηa,t ∈ S changes to the other type of expectation at a rate
(1) c(a, ηt) =
1
4
∑
b∈Z2:|b−a|=1
1{ηa,t 6=ηb,t}
The transition rate of an agent’s equilibrium expectation is thus proportional to the number
of neighboring agents holding a different equilibrium expectation. Clearly, if the expecta-
tions of agents were independent, the individual transition rate c(a, ·) would depend only
on ηa,t; in the case specified by the above rate, expectations are interdependent, but direct
interaction is restricted to next-neighbors.
It is to be shown that there exists a process with path-space distribution P η0 (with the
superscript indicating that the process starts at the initial configuration η0 in time 0) such
that for each a ∈ A and each initial configuration η0
(2) P η0 [ηa,t 6= ηa,0] = c(a, η0)t+ o(t)
for t→ 0. Moreover, in continuous time it is natural to require that the process P η0 is such
that at most one coordinate changes in a point in time, i.e. for each a, b ∈ A and each η0
(3) P η0 [ηa,t 6= ηa,0, ηb,t 6= ηb,0] = o(t)
for t→ 0. The existence and uniqueness of such a process has been shown, among others,
by means of the Markov semigroup approach and the Hille-Yosida theorem. The reader is
referred to Liggett (1985) for a thorough treatment of these issues.
Let P(X) denote the set of all probability measures on the set X of expectation-
configurations, equipped with the topology of weak convergence, i.e.
µn ⇒ µ ∈ P(X)⇔
∫
fdµn →
∫
fdµ ∀f ∈ C(X)
with C(X) denoting the space of continuous functions on X. Suppose µ ∈ P(X) as an
initial distribution of the process. The probability measure of the process at time t, denoted
by µS(t) ∈ P(X) is implicitly defined via∫
fd[µS(t)] =
∫
S(t)fdµ ∀f ∈ C(X),
with (St)t∈R+ denoting the Markov semigroup of the process.
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A measure µ ∈ P(X) is called invariant for (St)t∈R+ if µSt = µ for all t ≥ 0. The set
of all invariant measures will be denoted by I. Invariant measures represent equilibrium-
states for the underlying stochastic process. Only invariant measures can obtain as limiting
distributions of the process (see Liggett, 1985, p.10).4
The property that a process converges to a single limit distribution from any initial
measure (implying that I is a singleton) is called probabilistic ergodicity of a process. For
the Voter Model, non-ergodicity is obvious. Because transition rate is zero for an agent
in agreement with all his next-neighbors, the Voter Model has as invariant measures at
least the point-mass measures concentrated on the full-consensus configurations ηei with
(ηei)a = ei ∀a, with i = 1, 2. These measures are denoted by δei . Every convex combination
δα = αδe1 + (1− α)δe2 with α ∈ (0, 1) is also an invariant measure, but for these measures
macroscopic events remain random. In particular, the empirical distribution is random,
with probability α for occurrence of a full-consensus on e1, and 1− α for e2.
For the interpretation of the expectations dynamics as a coordination process a question
to be asked is whether there exists stable coexistence of opinions, i.e. whether there exist
extremal invariant measures other than δe1 and δe2 . For the present model, the answer is
negative5 (see Liggett (1985, Sect. V 1)). The following property, called clustering, holds
for the two-dimensional Voter Model (see Liggett (1999), Th. 1.3, p.141)
(4) lim
t→∞
P η0(ηt(a) 6= ηt(b)) = 0
for all a, b ∈ Z2 and all initial conditions η0. Thus, for any arbitrary large finite volume, after
a long enough period of time one observes (almost) all agents having assumed expectations
of the same type.
Theorem 1.9 with Corollary 1.13 from Liggett (1985, p.231) provide necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for convergence for a wide class of initial measures. An example is the
following statement Let µ ∈ P(X) denote a translation-invariant measure with marginals
µ{η : η(a) = e1} = α. Then
lim
n→∞
µS(t) = αδe1 + (1− α)δe2 .
However, there are initial conditions for which convergence does not occur.
Having reviewed some facts about the limiting behavior of the considered expectations
dynamics, we shall now relate them to the “limiting expectation” of each individual. The
4The formal statement is: If ν = limt→∞ µSt exists for some initial measure µ ∈ P(X), then ν ∈ I.
5The answer is positive for lattice-dimension greater than or equal three (for details, see Liggett (1985,
Sect. V 1)).
7reader is reminded that by the definition of the expectations dynamics only the two point
expectations e1 will occur with certainty and e2 will occur with certainty constitute the
individual state space of the process. However, if an agent is assumed to sample the path
of his own equilibrium expectation over time, or the path of equilibrium expectations in a
small subset of agents “close” to him, the notion of a “limiting expectation” based on his
individual limiting statistics arises, allowing a more general type of expectations to appear.
The question is how such a “limiting expectation” is related to the limiting distribution of
the compound process.
With Equation 4 in mind, one can think of two local scenarios for the convergence path
of the considered process when it converges to a non-extremal measure, with different
implications for the “limiting expectations” of individual agents. First, in any large but
finite volume the process “settles randomly on one extremal invariant measure”6 (with
probabilities α and 1− α respectively). Second, in any such volume the process oscillates
infinitely often “between the two invariant measures”. Cox and Griffeath (1986) and, in a
more general setting, Cox and Klenke (2000) have shown that the second scenario actually
obtains for the present model. Moreover, the weights α and 1−α determine the proportion
of time spent “close” to either one of the extremal measures (again, restricted to a large
finite volume).
By the above result, each agent arrives at a “limiting expectation” being a distribution
on {e1, e2} with exactly the same weights as the limiting distribution of the process places
on δe1 and δe2 . This leads to the following interpretation to be elaborated in the following
section: If the limiting distribution is one of the extremal measures δe1 and δe2 , each agent
will expect a determinate full-coordination outcome, either on e1 or e2. (It is then natural
to assume that the corresponding equilibrium of the underlying economy will be selected;
see Section 3.1.) If the limiting distribution is a non-extremal measure, each agent will
expect a full-coordination outcome, but with remaining randomness of whether it will be
e1 or e2. The main point, which will underlie Section 3.2, is that it is exactly this structure
of expectations which prevails in a sunspot equilibrium of an underlying economy.
3. Coordination of Expectations and the Emergence of Sunspot Equilibria
The present section places the stochastic dynamics of equilibrium expectations, the math-
ematical properties of which were outlined in the previous section, in the context of two
6More precisely, what is meant is the convergence in a finite volume to the projection of an infinite-volume
invariant measure to that finite-volume.
8 M. HOHNISCH
simple example economies, each a two-period (t = 0, 1) sequential-trade pure-exchange
economy. Yet before turning to the respective functions of the expectations dynamics in
these example economies, we shall provide some explanations applying to both situations.
The expectation dynamics is assumed to evolve, and its limiting distribution to emerge,
prior to trading decisions being made in period t = 0. It is important to remark that the
time scales of (the mathematical models of) the market exchange process in discrete time
and the expectations dynamics in continuous time are inherently incomparable. Therefore
it is up to the modeller to specify a relation between them. As a result, the convergence of
the process (the limit t → ∞) need not “take longer” than the time interval between two
consecutive trading periods.7 The limiting distribution of the expectations dynamics will
be called a coordination state. A realization of a configuration of individual equilibrium
expectations from this limiting distribution will be called a coordination outcome. The
coordination outcome is assumed to become known to the agents between t = 0 and t = 1.
Two principle types of coordination states can be distinguished according to whether or
not macroscopic uncertainty prevails in them. First, the process converges to one of its
extremal invariant measures, say δe1 . Then there is no uncertainty as to the coordination-
outcome, and all agents correctly assign the probability pi1 = 1 to the occurrence of ηe1 and
the probability pi2 = 0 to the occurrence of ηe2 . Second, the limiting distribution of the
process is a convex combination δα = αδe1 + (1− α)δe2 of its extremal invariant measures.
When a realization is drawn from the measure δα, it is either the full-consensus config-
uration ηe1 (with probability α), or the full-consensus configuration ηe2 (with probability
1− α).8 Importantly, it follows from the properties of the convergence of the process to a
mixed invariant measure, as described in the final part of Section 2, that each agent can
learn - by sampling the realizations of the process in any finite subset of agents - the correct
probabilities of the full-consensus outcomes. Thus, each agent will correctly expect an oc-
currence of the coordination outcome ηe1 with probability pi1 = α and of ηe2 with probability
pi2 = 1−α. Since in each non-extremal coordination-state δα = αδe1+(1−α)δe2 , α ∈ (0, 1)
the possible coordination-outcomes ηe1 and ηe2 both have non-zero probabilities (and be-
cause agents are automatically in agreement about the associated equilibrium in each of
7For that reason, no conceptual problems would arise in extending the model to a multiperiod setting, with
the convergence of the coordination process taking place between consecutive periods.
8With a more general specification of the expectations dynamics, it would no longer be the case that only
full-consensus configurations appear in the support of the limiting distribution of the process. In that more
general case, the empirical distribution would characterize the coordination state. The latter is a random
measure on S (see further comments on the specific choice of the Voter model on Z2 in Section 4).
9them), these coordination outcomes can play the role of the sunspot-events (see Section
3.2).
3.1. Coordination between multiple equilibria and trivial sunspots. In this sec-
tion, the underlying market structure is a pair of decoupled spot markets (i.e there are
no financial assets to transfer wealth between them) with multiple equilibria in the second
period. This structure ensures that possibly remaining randomness of the coordination
outcome has no impact on the set of market equilibria.
Consider an economy with a countably infinite set of agents. Assume that the spot market
of the economy in t = 1 allows for multiple – say two – equilibria, while no actions relevant
for period 1 can be taken in period t = 0. Each element of the individual state-space S is
the expectation that a specific market equilibrium will occur in t = 1. Say the process is
started at some configuration η0 or at some initial distribution µ0 for which convergence to
an invariant measure δ ∈ I is known to occur. According to the distinction made above,
the following coordination states can be distinguished. If the limiting measure is extremal,
then there is no macroscopic uncertainty, and the equilibrium which is expected will occur
(due to the rational assumption hypothesis or some mechanism). If the limiting measure
is non-extremal, say with weights α and 1 − α of the full-consensus states δe1 and δe2 in
the mixture, the coordination outcome is random. The expectations pi of the full-consensus
coordination outcomes ηe1 and ηe2 will be correct, i.e. pi1 = α and pi2 = 1 − α. This case
corresponds to what Mas-Colell (1992) calls a trivial sunspot equilibrium.
In the above situation, the expectations dynamics explains coordination of expectations
among the a-priori given equilibria and thereby equilibrium selection (due to the assumption
of rational expectations). However, it is obvious that since in this context the coordination
process has no real influence on the economy, the equilibrium selection role is a deus ex
machina (unless, of course, one is ready to consider a causal link via some real mechanism
from the expectations of agents to the equilibrium actually obtaining).
3.2. Coordination with remaining macroscopic uncertainty and the emergence
of sunspot-equilibria. With its basic lines already explicated, we shall now complete the
statement of the link between certain coordination outcomes of the expectations dynamics
and the emergence of sunspot equilibria in Walrasian models. For simplicity, the market
structure selected in this section is that of Cass’ (1989) leading example of sunspot equilibria
in Walrasian sequential economies with nominal assets. (For generalizations of that model
see Cass (1992) and Siconolfi (1991).) Assume a two-period (t = 0, 1) pure-exchange
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economy with a single good available in each period, its quantity denoted by yt, traded on
a spot market in period t. In period 0, there is also a financial instrument (bond), with
its quantities denoted by denoted by b. There is no uncertainty of fundamentals in the
economy, but agents might come to believe that the equilibrium depends on the outcome
of some external two-state (s = 1, 2) lottery (sunspot). The exogenous nominal returns r1
and r2 of the bond may depend on the sunspot outcome. The price of the good in period
t is denoted by pt. The spot price of the good in the second period may also depend on
a sunspot outcome. The price vector is denoted by p = (p0, p1,1, p1,2), with the second
superscript referring to the sunspot outcome. The price of the bond is set to one.
There are two agents, each characterized by a differentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ua : R2+ → R¯ with ua(0) = −∞,
and an endowment vector wa = (w
0
a, w
1
a, w
1
a) ∈ R3++. Neither the utility function nor the
endowment vector depend on the realization of the expectation coordination process. The
demand of agent a solves the maximization problem
(5) max
(y0a,ba,y
1,1
a ,y
1,2
a )
pi1ua(y
0
a, y
1,1
a ) + pi2ua(y
0
a, y
1,2
a )
subject to the constraint that the budget be balanced in both periods and states
(i) p0y0a + b
0
a = p
0w0a(6)
(ii) p1sy1sa = p
1sw1a + r
sba s = 1, 2.(7)
Let fy and fb denote the demand function for the good in the respective states and for the
bond in the zero period, respectively, defined on an appropriate set of prices. Cass (1989)
shows that sunspot equilibria generically exist in this model.
To relate the expectations dynamics specified above to the Cass (1989) example, our
economy is assumed to be constituted by countably infinite “copies” of the Cass (1989)
economy. We use the Hildenbrand’s (1974) distribution approach with the characteristics
distribution ν concentrated on two preference-endowment vectors (φi, wi), i = 1, 2 with
each having the weight of one-half. The mean good-demand then obtains as
(8) f¯y(p) =
∫
P×T
fy(p, φ, w)dν(φ,w) =
1
2
fy(p, φ1, w1) +
1
2
fy(p, φ2, w2)
while mean asset-demand obtains as
(9) f¯b(p) =
∫
P×T
fb(p, φ, w)dν(φ,w) =
1
2
fb(p, φ1, w1) +
1
2
fb(p, φ2, w2).
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Thus, the equilibrium market clearing conditions for the good-markets and the bond
market correspond to the two-agent economy conditions
(10) fy(p
∗, φ1, w1) + fy(p∗, φ2, w2) = w1 + w2,
(11) fb(p
∗, φ1, w1) + fb(p∗, φ2, w2) = 0.
Now, while the results on the Voter model discussed in Section 2 assure the existence of
limiting distributions corresponding to expectation coordination outcomes with complete
but random coordination on either e1 (with probability pi ∈ (0, 1)) or e2 (with probability
1−pi) and each agent correctly foreseeing this outcome, the results of Cass (1989) imply that
Walrasian market equilibria (sunspot equilibria) with precisely that expectation structure
exist for the infinite economy just specified. The random coordination outcome of the
process provides by its very nature the specification of a sunspot event with no additional
requirements on some agreement procedure required in the standard formulation of sunspot
equilibrium. Thus, the suggested expectation coordination mechanism can be considered
as a complement to the sunspot literature by explaining how sunspot expectations can
actually emerge in a decentralized way.
Since the set of equilibria emerges only upon convergence of the process, it seems un-
reasonable to assume that agents know equilibrium prices and their respective allocations
before the limiting distribution has emerged. Yet for a consistent definition of the inter-
acting process, agents need not to know the details of the equilibrium while the process is
unfolding, they just must be able to distinguish whether or not they have the same expec-
tation as each of their neighbors (because of the specific formulation of transition rates in
Equation 1). For practical purposes, the concrete content of e1 and e2 might be thought
of being provided by two competing “forecast agencies” and it might well be time-varying
while the coordination process unfolds.
Concluding this section, we emphasize the difference of the respective roles the expec-
tation coordination process plays in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively: the expectation
coordination process as defined in the present paper can facilitate equilibrium selection (as
it does in Section 3.1) only if, first, the set of market equilibria is a-priori given rather than
determined by the limiting distribution of process and, second, the set of market equilibria
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is finite. (The second condition is due to the fact that the Voter model has a finite individ-
ual state space.9) In contrast, in the present Section 3.2 the state space {e1, e2} emerges
as representing components of equilibrium in different states (defined by the coordination
outcome), jointly constituting a single sunspot equilibrium, rather than different equilib-
ria. Therefore, equilibrium selection is exogenous (i.e. left to the “Walrasian auctioneer”
or “forecast agencies”) in the sunspot context considered in Section 3.2. This clearly is
somewhat unfortunate, all the more because the set of sunspot equilibria turns out to be a
continuum set (see Cass (1989, 1992)).10
4. Discussion
This final section of the paper contains additional remarks on the presented ideas and
relates them to economic literature featuring similar types of stochastic processes. We
begin by addressing the following possible objection to one of the paper’s statements: one
could argue that since the expectation coordination process is not affected by the agents’
consumption and saving decisions, it is as much exogenous to the economy as the vaguely
specified sunspot event, in effect being no different from a biased coin. However, while
the structure of the limiting distribution of the two-dimensional Voter model indeed corre-
sponds to that of a biased coin, the associated coordination mechanism is fully decentralized
and endogenously both providing the sunspot event and ensuring the proper correlation of
events and equilibria, none of which is provided by the biased-coin mechanism. Neverthe-
less, it would presumably be a worthwhile endeavour to specify a feedback from individual
or macroscopic variables of the economy to the coordination process of expectations (in a
multiple-period setting). Conceptually, a feedback from macroscopic to microscopic expec-
tational variables was recently proposed by Hahn (2003). Technically, it can be introduced
and analyzed using mathematical concepts and results of Fo¨llmer (1979) and Fo¨llmer and
Horst (2001).
An issue deserving elaboration is the specific role of the two-dimensional Voter Model as
the underlying stochastic process. In fact, the property that the set of extremal invariant
measures consists of just the two full-consensus point-mass configurations is specific to the
Voter Model for lattice-dimension less or equal two. For lattice-dimension three or more,
9Equilibrium selection for economies with a continuum of equilibria can be facilitated by analogous processes
with a continuum individual state space, but such models are beyond the scope of the present paper.
10A immediate solution to this problem would be a two-stage combination of a the mechanisms of Section
3.2 (sunspot emergence) and 3.1 (equilibrium selection), with the latter facilitated by an appropriate
multicomponent process with a continuum individual state space.
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there appear additional extremal invariant measures not concentrated on full-consensus
configurations. The same is true if the transition probabilities are slightly changed. For
instance, if the transition rate for an agent is slightly positive despite all his neighbors
being in agreement with him, the resulting invariant measures (there are multiple such
measures for lattice-dimension two or more) no longer have an empirical distribution con-
centrated on full-consensus outcomes. Then, though there is no macroscopic uncertainty
for translation-invariant extremal measures, a fixed percentage of agents deviates from
the majority expectation in these states. There are interesting economic implications of
the emergence of such residual heterogeneity, but they call for a separate treatment and
discussion.
Finally, we shall comment on the relation of the present paper to the existing economic
literature featuring similar types of interacting stochastic processes. Two important in-
stances of that literature are the papers of Blume (1993) and Kosfeld (2005). The main
point of the comparison turns out to be that it is the non-ergodicity of the stochastic
process which is essential in the present paper, while that appears not to be the case for
Blume’s (1993) and Kosfeld’s (2005) work.
Blume (1993) defines a process of myopic individual strategy revision in a countably
infinite population of players. Each player plays a series of independent games against
a number of players in his “neigborhood” (the latter being defined by the topology of
the integer lattice). He changes his strategy at random times according to a combination
of best-response and random factors. Beyond the obvious contextual aspects, the main
structural difference between Blume’s (1993) model and the present one lies in the fact
that the players in Blume’s (1993) model do not respond to macroscopic variables of the
process, as do players in the present model. Therefore, non-ergodicity and – associated
with it – remaining macroscopic uncertainty do not appear to play a particular role in
Blume’s (1993) model.
In Kosfeld’s (2005) model the individual state space consists of two beliefs about the
prevailing state of nature: agents may either hold a default belief (which is specified as the
true one), or they can believe in a rumor (which is objectively wrong, but still able to alter
the economic variable if enough agents come to believe in it). While the structure of the
transition rates specified by Kosfeld (corresponding to the so-called Contact process, see
Liggett (1985), Chapter VI) differs from that of the Voter model (for instance, transition
between the idividual states is not symmetric), the Kosfeld (2005) model is based on the
same behavioral assumptions with regard to interactions as our model (agents tend to
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believe in the rumor if their neighbors do). The Kosfeld (2005) paper does not, however,
address the economic implications of the convergence of the belief dynamics to a limiting
distribution with remaining macroscopic uncertainty.
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A Percolation-Based Model Explaining Delayed Take-Off in
New-Product Diffusion
Martin Hohnisch, Sabine Pittnauer and Dietrich Stauffer1
Abstract
A model of new-product diffusion is proposed in which a site-percolation dynamics
represents socially-driven diffusion of knowledge about the product’s characteris-
tics in a population of potential buyers. A consumer buys the new product if
her valuation of it is not below the price of the product announced in a given
period. Our model attributes the empirical finding of a delayed “take-off” of a
new product to a drift of the percolation dynamics from a non-percolating regime
to a percolating regime. This drift is caused by learning effects lowering the price
of the product, or by network effects increasing its valuation by consumers, both
with an increasing number of buyers.
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1 Introduction
The understanding of innovation is central in the study of capitalistic economies
(see Schumpeter (1911, 1942)). In particular, there exists a rich literature ana-
lyzing the incentives for industrial innovation, starting with Arrow (1962). In the
present paper, however, we take as given that a new product has emerged and
concentrate on the time-profile of its spread in a population of consumers.
The analysis of the process of adoption of a new product (in the following
termed new-product diffusion) constitutes an important research area in both mar-
keting science and economics. From a practitioner’s perspective, relevant questions
are, for instance, how to forecast whether the new product will “take-off” (see Gar-
ber et al. (2004)), or, once it did, the level of its future sales depending on the
use of elements of the marketing mix (see e.g. Bass et al. (2000); see also Chan-
drasekaran and Tellis (2005) for a general overview). From a more theoretical
perspective, one is interested, for instance, in why consumers develop preferences
for new products (see Witt (2001)), or whether adoption processes tend to be
“path-dependent” or “ergodic” (see David (1985)).
Three main approaches to quantitative modeling of the time-profile of new-
product diffusion can be distinguished: First, the essentially phenomenological
models of new-product diffusion, starting with the contribution of Bass (1969).
The Bass-model has seen numerous refinements over the years (for an overview,
see Mahajan et al. (1990, 1995)), and can reproduce the evolution of sales over a
wide range of the product life cycle employing appropriate parameter fits. Second,
micro-models of new-product diffusion focusing on rational individual decision-
making (see, for instance, David and Olsen (1986, 1992)). These models typically
ascribe to consumers a high degree of sophistication, in particular consumers cor-
rectly foresee the future evolution of the market. The dynamics of diffusion is
driven by the interplay of expectations and utility maximization. Third, stochas-
tic micromodels of new-product diffusion which focus on collective effects, often
with a simplistic specification of decision making. These most recently proposed
models are variants of the spatial stochastic process called percolation2 (see e.g.
Allen (1982), Mort (1991), David and Foray (1994), Solomon et al. (2000), Gold-
enberg et al. (2000), Silverberg and Verspagen (2005)).
Our present model falls in the percolation-based category (yet it features a
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model of the individual adoption decision). It aims to explain the empirical phe-
nomenon that in the early stages of new-product diffusion low levels of sales often
persist over a prolonged period of time before a “take-off” occurs (for a detailed
discussion of this phenomenon see Golder and Tellis (1997) and Geroski (2003)).
Serving as a prototypical example of this phenomenon, Figure 1 (top) depicts the
cumulative frequency of adopters of a novel agricultural technique in Iowa in the
first half of the last century. The data in Figure 1 (top) is adapted from Ryan and
Gross (1943). (More examples of long-tailed diffusion curves along with a discus-
sion of the phenomenon of a delayed “take-off” of new products can be found in
Mort (1991) and Golder and Tellis (1997).) Our model provides a possible analyt-
ical explanation for delayed take-off in new-product diffusion with an underlying
myopic individual decision-making model, i.e. avoiding a self-fulfilling-prophecy
mechanism relying on rational expectations. Our model attributes the empirical
finding of a delayed “take-off” of a new product to a drift of the percolation dy-
namics from a non-percolating regime to a percolating regime. This drift is caused
by learning effects lowering the price of the product, or by network effects increas-
ing its valuation by consumers, both with an increasing number of buyers. Up to
our knowledge, the proposed model is the first one capable of explaining delayed
take-off as a purely collective coordination phenomenon.3
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 specifies the basic model.
Section 3 introduces macroscopic feedbacks and shows by Monte Carlo simulations
that the latter can lead to a diffusion-dynamics exhibiting a delayed take-off. The
paper concludes with a brief discussion of some additional aspects of our model.
2 The basic model
We model the process of diffusion of a new product4 (the emergence of which is
assumed rather than explained in our model) among a large population of con-
sumers. Time is discrete. In any period t, a consumer may buy either one unit
of the product or none, with at most one unit bought over the entire time hori-
zon. The individual decision model of a consumer consists of three steps: firstly,
learning the product’s characteristics, secondly, forming an individual (subjective)
valuation of it, and thirdly, comparing one’s individual valuation with the price
set by the producer.
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An essential ingredient of our model is a local “spatial”5 stochastic dynamics
triggering the individual assessment of the product’s value by each consumer (i.e.
potential buyer). Underlying such a dynamics is a social network – left exogenous
in the present paper6 – modeled as a graph. We specify this graph as a two-
dimensional square lattice. In the infinite version of the model, Z2 represents the
set of nodes (consumers), with a link between any two a, b ∈ Z2 existing if and only
if ||a− b|| = 1, with || · || denoting the Euclidean distance in R2. Two consumers
who are directly linked are called nearest neighbors. Each consumer has thus four
nearest neighbors. Our particular choice of the network model is presumably not a
realistic one. Alas, we are not aware of empirical studies investigating topologies of
interactions in our particular context, while results of studies investigating social
network topologies related with other types of human interactions do not appear
to be a-priori transferable (see Schnegg (2006)). Yet the principle mechanism by
which a “take-off dynamics” is generated in our model with feedbacks (see Section
3) does not depend on the specific topology of the underlying network (with an
exceptional case to be discussed in the last section of this paper).
While the benchmark percolation model is defined on the infinite lattice, to
investigate properties of our model by Monte-Carlo simulations the set of potential
buyers is represented by a finite square-shaped subset Λ ⊂ Z2. Consumers at the
boundary of Λ are also linked with consumers at the opposite boundary of the
square.
In the first period, the dynamics is initialized by the introduction of a fixed
number of early buyers located randomly in the population. The origin of such
“early birds” is exogenous to our model. In each of the subsequent periods, the
nearest neighbors of those consumers who bought the product in the immediately
preceding period acquaint themselves with the product by observing or being ex-
posed to its usage.7 Based on that experience they form their individual valuations
of the product reflected in the reservation price θa (i.e. the highest price at which
consumer a would buy). The formation of the individual valuation θa is made only
once – thus it is not reassessed if in a later period another nearest neighbor of
consumer a buys the product. We assume in our model that the transfer of “ex-
perience of the product” from one consumer to another is “neutral” in the sense
that the valuation formed by consumer a does not depend on the valuation of
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that buyer who triggered the formation of a’s valuation. Thus we specify that θa
is a realization of the random variable Θa with the family (Θa)a∈Λ independently
identically distributed. To directly relate our basic model to the standard perco-
lation model which will be briefly explicated below, each random variable Θa is
equi-distributed on [0, 1].
Finally, the consumer’s decision to buy the new product is the following: con-
sumer a buys the product if her individual valuation θa exceeds or equals the price
p of the product. Thus, the decision to buy the new product is “socially transmit-
ted” only in the sense that it is by experiencing the product via one’s immediate
social environment that a consumer forms the valuation of it.
We employ a simple specification of the supply side as consisting of a “non-
maximizing”8 monopolist using mark-up pricing i.e. the price p is given by the
formula
p = (1 +m)c (1)
with c denoting the unit production costs and m a positive number, the time-
constant mark-up. (See Blinder (1991) and Hall et al. (1997) for empirical evidence
that firms indeed use mark-up pricing.) In accordance with the specification of
the range of individual valuations we assume that p ∈ [0, 1].
The model specified so far can be easily mapped on a well-known mathematical
model called site percolation, and we shall briefly describe some of its basic prop-
erties. In the simplest case of an (atemporal) site-percolation model with some
underlying countably infinite graph structure, say a square lattice Z2, each site
of the graph is randomly assigned a value from {0, 1}, with probability P for a
realization of the value 1. A site to which the value 0 is assigned, can, for instance,
represent a site which is in some sense “non-active”, while a site to which the value
1 is assigned is “active”. The assignment of each value is stochastically indepen-
dent of the values assigned to other sites. Percolation is said to occur if there
appears at least one infinite unbounded cluster9 of “active” sites. It turns out that
there is a threshold-value for the probability P , denoted by Pc, such that such
an infinite cluster of “active” sites occurs with probability 1 for P > Pc and with
probability 0 for P < Pc (see Grimmett (1999) and Stauffer and Aharony (1994)).
For the particular graph structure specified in the paper (two-dimensional square
lattice) we have approximately Pc = 0.592743.
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To apply Monte-Carlo techniques for the analysis of percolation models, several
instances of stochastic processes on finite subsets of Zn were proposed enabling to
decide whether or not percolation occurs in a given (possibly infinite) model based
on samples of the process. Such processes are typically initiated with an “active”
site located in the center of the graph, and in each time step nearest neighbors
of an active site may themselves become active with probability P , independently
of each other, with the state of each site realized only once in time (see Leath
(1976)). For such processes, the percolation threshold Pc constitutes a value for the
“transmission probability” above which “active” sites spread over the entire graph
with a significant probability, but “die out” below of it, unless for extremely rare
instances. Indeed, the dynamics of our basic model specified above corresponds to
the Leath-algorithm of percolation.
Let us now return to our particular model context. The probability for a
consumer to buy the product, given she comes to form her valuation (the latter
condition is referred to as C), is the probability that her valuation θa falls into
the interval [p, 1]. Thus Prob(a buys|C) = 1− p. The above quoted results imply
that in the new-product diffusion model specified so far there is a threshold value
for the price p such that for p > pc the diffusion of the product will “die out” but
will spread over the population for p < pc. We have pc = 1 − Pc, the numerical
value being approximately 1− Pc = 0.407. A generic time profile of the adoption
dynamics of the basic model is illustrated in Figure 2: percolation occurs for
p = 0.39, but does not occur for p = 0.52. Figure 3 (top) depicts the final share
of buyers as a function of the price. A drastic decrease of that share occurs at
pc = 0.407.
Note that while the functional form of the time-profile of sales in our model
depends on the particular network structure, the occurrence of spread over the
entire population of consumers depends only on whether the prevailing price p is
above or below pc (with pc depending on the particular type of network).
In the next section we will extend our basic model by macroscopic feedbacks
which can affect the price or the valuation (or both). It turns out that this fea-
ture can produce a “drift” of the percolation dynamics from a “non-percolating
regime” to a “percolating regime”, thereby facilitating a dynamics corresponding
to a delayed “take-off”.
6
3 New-product diffusion with macroscopic feedbacks
In the following we introduce two types of macroscopic feedback mechanisms. We
specify a feedback affecting the supply side by assuming that unit production costs
decrease with the cumulative quantity of units already produced. The decrease
of unit production costs is empirically well established and explained by learning
within the firm. Decreasing unit production costs are associated with the “learn-
ing curve” (see e.g. Yelle (1979)) and with the related notion of “economies of
scale” (see e.g. Scherer and Ross (1990)). In our model, the “learning curve”
is represented by a functional relationship ct = f(Nt−1) with Nt−1 denoting the
number of consumers who bought the product up to period t − 1. To represent
empirical data, the function f (assumed to be at least twice differentiable) should
satisfy f(x) > 0, f ′(x) < 0 and f ′′(x) > 0 for the non-negative real numbers. The
time-dependent price obtains from Eq. 1 as
pt = (1 +m)f(Nt−1). (2)
We specify a feedback affecting the demand side based on the notion of “net-
work externalities” (David (1985), Katz and Shapiro (1992)): For each consumer
a, the initial valuation θa increases by an amount proportional to the fraction of
buyers in the population. We have thus a time-dependent individual valuation
θa,t = θa + µ
Nt−1
N
, (3)
with some constant µ which we assume to be independent of a; N denotes the
total number of potential buyers. Note that with the above assumption on the
distribution of Θa it is not the case that θa,t ∈ [0, 1] always holds, see Eq. 4.
Depending on the nature of the product considered, either one of the feedback
effects might vanish. For instance, computer software presumably exhibits only
the second kind of feedback effect, while household electronics exhibit only the
first.
Because in the extended model the price and the individual valuation may be
time-dependent the decision rule reads: consumer a buys in t with t ≥ ta (with ta
denoting the time period in which consumer a learns the product’s characteristics
and forms an initial valuation) if
θa,t ≥ pt and θa,t < pτ for all τ : ta ≤ τ < t,
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i.e. a consumer buys the product as soon as her individual valuation equals or
exceeds the price. Thus, unlike in the basic model, a consumer may buy in a
period subsequent to the one in which she formed her (initial) valuation. The
probability of buying thus increases over time. For a consumer who forms her
evaluation in period t (condition C), the probability to buy in period t obtains as
Prob(a buys in t|C) =



1− pt + µ
Nt−1
N
if 0 ≤ 1− pt + µ
Nt−1
N
≤ 1
0 if 1− pt + µ
Nt−1
N
< 0
1 if 1− pt + µ
Nt−1
N
> 1.
(4)
In each period subsequent to the period in which valuation is formed, the decision
of a consumer who has not yet bought might be revised.
Note that the two types of macroscopic feedback effects are mathematically
equivalent in the sense that with increasing Nt−1 the existing gaps between the
price of the product and individual valuations of consumers who have not yet
bought the product tend to vanish. For that reason, many qualitative results do
not depend upon which type of feedback is considered.
Using Monte-Carlo simulations, we find for the model with feedback(s) the
general result that there exists a range of initial prices (for instance, for the model
with supply-side feedback and the particular parameter specification as depicted in
Figure 3 (bottom) between approximately 0.407 and 0.529) for which the product
“takes off” eventually, despite it would not take-off in the basic model of Section
2. For this range of initial prices, the per-period sales curve exhibits two specific
phases. First, a very low sales level persists corresponding to the system being in
the non-percolating regime. The dynamics may exhibit a temporary decrease of
per-period sales resulting from local diffusion seeds (initiated by exogenous initial
buyers) which “die out” before the system reaches the percolating regime. Second,
a “take-off” phase occurring when diffusion seeds which “survived” long enough
enter the percolating regime. The general principle underlying that delayed take-off
behavior is thus that the diffusion dynamics may “drift” from the non-percolating
regime to the percolating regime. This drift occurs because the probability of
buying increases over time with the cumulative number of buyers and because
consumers who did not buy initially can revise their decision later on.
In the remainder of this section, we present Monte Carlo simulations of the
model with feedback for particular parameter values. We maintain the assump-
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tion that the initial individual valuation θa is equi-distributed on [0, 1].
10 Figure
1 (bottom) depicts a diffusion curve, averaged over 500 simulation runs, in the
model with macroscopic feedback affecting only the demand side with one initial
buyer in period t = 1, a 501× 501 lattice, a time-independent price p = 0.433 and
the parameter µ equal to 0.4. The reader may think of this averaged curve as mod-
eling new-product diffusion in a population located in many cities with network
externalities affecting the population within a single city only. A comparison of
Figure 1 (top) and (bottom) illustrates that our model can explain long flat tails
empirically observed in the early stages of new-product diffusion.
Figure 4 depicts the averaged evolution of per-period sales (left-hand side)
and cumulative sales (right-hand side) resulting from a specification with one ini-
tial buyer in period t = 1 on a 501 × 501 lattice. Macroscopic feedback affects
the demand side only; the time-independent price is set to p = 0.435 (top) and
p = 0.421 (bottom) and the constant µ describing the influence of network exter-
nalities equals 0.4. For both prices, the curves are obtained by averaging over 500
simulation runs. Note that the threshold product price being approximately 0.407,
for both the new product would not spread over the population in the basic model
without macroscopic feedbacks. However, because individual valuations increase
with the number of buyers Nt, some simulation runs persist up to the point where
the additional term in Eq. 3 closes the gap between the average evaluation and
the price, so that spread of the product occurs. The length of the long left tail
increases with p and decreases with µ ceteris paribus. A comparison of Figure 4
(top) with Figure 4 (bottom) exemplifies the first part of this statement. Further-
more, the decrease of per period sales in the first phase as visible in Figure 4 (top,
left-hand side) increases with increasing price.
Figure 5 depicts three curves corresponding to per-period sales, cumulative
share of buyers and the evolution of the product price resulting from a single
simulation run in a setting with macroscopic feedbacks affecting the supply side
only. We specify the time-dependent price pt (see Eq. 2) as
p(nt−1) = p0 − qnt−1 + αn
2
t−1, (5)
with the fraction of buyers nt−1 =
Nt−1
N
, the initial price p0 ∈ [0, 1] and q > 0 and
α > 0 constant parameters. Figure 5 corresponds to the parameter values q = 0.5,
p0 = 0.52 and α = 0.095. The initial number of buyers equals 3000 and lattice size
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is 1501×1501. Initial price p0 is set to 0.52. Figure 5 shows that the characteristic
take-off dynamics displayed by the averaged curves of Figure 4 can be obtained
from a single simulation run. This is significant because in the case of macroscopic
feedbacks affecting the price, averaging over multiple simulation runs is difficult
to justify (as it would involve a scenario with different price sequences in different
“cities”, so that the issue of arbitrage opportunities would become relevant).
4 Discussion
We conclude the paper with two comments. First, while the functional form of
the time-profile of sales in our model might depend on the particular underly-
ing topology, the phenomenon of delayed “take-off” itself does not (except for
possible changes of the parameter range for which it occurs). This is because it
relies solely on the existence of a percolation threshold pc separating a percolating
regime from a non-percolating regime of the dynamics. It is the passage of the
dynamics from the former to the latter that facilitates the “take-off” phenomenon.
However, for a certain type of graph structures – called scale-free networks – the
percolation threshold tends to zero with a growing number of sites (see Cohen
et al. (2000)). Thus, delayed “take-off” would not occur in our model with a
scale-free network representing the topology of local interactions. It is tempting
to empirically test this implication of our model, once comparative studies on in-
teraction/communication topologies related with different product categories or
technologies are available.
Second, though in our model individual valuations of the new product made by
consumers are not subject to local social influence (by which a consumer’s valuation
is directly affected by those of her next neighbors), we do believe that such effects
are realistic (for interesting phenomena resulting from such local interdependencies
in valuation see, for instance, Goldenberg at al. (2000), Solomon et al. (2000) and
Erez et al. (2006)). However, the present paper aims at explaining the occurrence
of delayed take-off as simply as possible.
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Figure 1: (top): Cumulative frequency of adopters for the diffusion of hybrid corn
seed in two Iowa farming communities adapted from [25]; (bottom): cumulative
number of buyers in our model with demand-side feedback and the parameter
values p = 0.433 and µ = 0.4; data averaged over 500 simulation runs on a
501× 501 lattice (bottom) with one initial buyer in each simulation run.
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Figure 2: Per-period number of buyers (left-hand side) and cumulative shares of
buyers over time (right-hand side) in the basic model of Section 2; curves corre-
spond to a single simulation run on a 1501× 1501 lattice with 3000 initial buyers;
percolation occurs for a price p=0.39 (top) but does not occur for p=0.52 (bottom).
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Figure 3: (top): Total (final) share of buyers as a function of price in the basic
model (without macroscopic feedback) of Section 2; each point of the curve corre-
sponds to a single simulation run on a 1501×1501 lattice with 3000 initial buyers;
(bottom): total (final) share of buyers as a function of initial price in the model
with supply-side-feedbacks and parameters as in Figure 5; in the bottom figure
delayed take-off occurs for initial prices in the range enclosed by the two dashed
lines, that is for initial prices between 0.407 and 0.529.
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Figure 4: Per-period number of buyers (left-hand side) and cumulative number
of buyers (right-hand side) in our model with parameter values p = 0.435 and
µ = 0.4 (top) and p = 0.421 and µ = 0.4 (bottom) on a 501 × 501 lattice; data
points correspond to the average over 500 simulation runs each with one initial
buyer.
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Figure 5: Per-period number of buyers (top), cumulative share of buyers (middle)
and the evolution of price (bottom) in our model with macroscopic feedback af-
fecting supply side only; the curves corrrespond to a single simulation run with
3000 initial buyers, lattice size 1501× 1501 and initial price p0 = 0.52.
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Notes
1 We are grateful to Paul A. David for many valuable comments on an earlier version of this
paper. Any conceptual and technical shortcomings of the paper belong to us.
2For an introduction to percolation and its applications see Stauffer and Aharony (1994). An
advanced mathematical treatment of percolation can be found in the monograph by Grimmett
(1999).
3Delayed take-off of new products has been explained in the model of David and Olsen (1986,
1992) in the context of rational expectations.
4We believe that our diffusion model can be applied to the more general issue of diffusion of
innovations. However, that more general context would require a more specific analysis of the
question of why and how innovations get adopted (see, for instance, Nelson et al. (2004)). In
the present paper in the context of a new product, we confine ourselves to specifying an abstract
framework using the notion valuation which is popular in abstract decision models in economics.
5The type of stochastic process which is considered in the present paper is usually referred to
as a spatial or spatio-temporal process, though the distance between individual entities may have
very different interpretations in particular aplications. In the present paper, the distance is a
social distance between consumers, which is not necessarily related to the geographical distance
between them.
6An interesting question is how such networks emerge in social systems. This question is
beyond the scope of our present investigation, but see, for instance, the paper of Schnegg (2006)
for an investigation of this question in a different social context.
7We assume that buyers enable all their nearest neighbors to experience the product corre-
sponding to the case of pure site-percolation, i.e. bonds are always “open”.
8 The standard textbook model of a profit-maximizing monopolist is based on the assumption
that the monopolist knows the demand function. In the situation where the demand function is
strongly time-dependent, this assumption is not a realistic one, and different approaches – such
as mark-up pricing – appear well suited.
9A cluster is a set of connected sites all of them featuring a certain property.
10With this distribution being, for instance, a truncated normal distribution on [0, 1] all qual-
itative results were reestablished.
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